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THE FEDERAL CONTROL OF STATE
EMPLOYEES IN AUSTRALIA
ERic ARMOUR BEEROFTe
In the federal systems of the English-speaking world, business
men, workers, farmers and economists, as well as lawyers, have
been profoundly concerned with the judicial process. Some of the
reasons for this concern, in the case of Australia, were shown in an
article in the April number of this journal.' In that article, I dis-
cussed (1) the circumstances leading to the enactment of the "con-
ciliation and arbitration" clause, 51 (xxxv), of the Commonwealth
Constitution; (2) the attempts of the Commonwealth Parliament,
under that clause, to confer upon the federal Arbitration Court the
power to declare a "common rule," that is, a code of conditions
for an entire industry, as a function ancillary to its task of pre-
venting and settling inter-state disputes; (3) the disallowance of
this power by the High Court in the Whybrow case ;2 (4) the con-
siderable extension, by later practice and by judicial interpretation
of the term "disputes," of the Arbitration Court's jurisdiction
over industrial conditions; and (5) the difficulties resulting from
the maze of technicalities and from the delays involved in de-
termining questions of jurisdiction.
Another problem in political policy and constitutional law in
Australia has been the question of the power of the federal Arbi-
tration Court to make awards binding on state employees. Such a
matter would, perhaps, not be one of major concern in the United
States or Canada; but in a country where an unusually large pro-
portion of the population are employed in state-owned enterprizes,
it has had a special importance.
The economic and political factors which gave rise to this
problem of interpretation are of particular interest to the student
of federalism. The Australian Constitution was enacted by the Im-
perial Parliament in 1900,- and the first Commonwealth Parliament
met in 1901. No sooner was the central government established than
it became the field of conflict for all of the major forces of Aus-
* Lecturer in Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles.
1 The Control of Industry in a Federal System (1935) 41 W. VA. L. Q.
206-224. That article and the present discussion contain material used in a
dissertation presented to Yale University in June, 1934, in candidacy for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
2 11 C. L. R. 311 (1910).
3 63 & 64 Viet., c. 12 (1900).
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tralian economic life. Itself a result of nationalizing economic and
cultural forces, the central government in turn provided a stimulus
for the continued growth and consolidation of Australian as dis-
tinct from local movements. It is notable that the National Labor
Party began its militant career with the first Commonwealth
elections and, within three and a half years of federation, its leader
was Prime Minister. 4
The rapid unification of the labor movement was accompanied
by an increasing demand for complete Commonwealth power over
industry and commerce. This was apparent even in the first session
of the new Commonwealth Parliament in 1901.' Indeed, feder-
alism in Australian politics may almost be said to have started on
its rapid decline as soon as it was put into operation. It is not
possible to find in the experience of any other federation so early
and so wide a divergence of opinion from the intentions of the con-
stitution-makers.
Unable to persuade the state governments, however, to give up
their power over industry and commerce, the advocates of national
industrial legislation set about making use of the "conciliation and
arbitration" power. Vehement discussions took place in two sessions
of Parliament while the arbitration bills were under consideration.
Especially heated debate occurred over the provision that the
Arbitration Act should not apply to the public servants of the
Commonwealth or of a state. This provision was tentatively ac-
cepted; but an amendment was proposed by a Labor member that
the Act should apply to railway employees of the state.6
In view of the fact that this same object was later attained
through judicial interpretation, it is interesting to notice that Mr.
Deakin, speaking for the government, warned emphatically that
this provision, if enacted, would destroy the self-governing powers
of the states. It would place them under a tribunal with authority
to decide the terms and conditions under which railway servants
should be employed. The amendment was carried against the
government, and the bill was abandoned.
When a new conciliation and arbitration bill was introduced
in the next session of Parliament, the same controversy over the
subordination of the states was raised again. The Labor Party, on
which Mr. Deakin's Ministry depended for support, urged with
4 TURNEr, THE FiRsT DECADE oF THE AUSTRALIAN COMmONWEALTH (1911)
83 et seq.
SSupra n. 1, at 206-208.
0 TuRNEa, op. cit. supra n. 4, c. 6.
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even more determination the inclusion of all state servants under
the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal. It was evident in the
debate that the Labor Party was aiming ultimately, through the
federal Arbitration Court, to secure control of the industrial estab-
lishments, both public and private, in all the states. It was
thoroughly realized by both sides that the issue was really whether
a system should be established to permit employees, by collusion
with their fellow-employees in other states, to bring their disputes
under a central tribunal which, it was hoped, Would enable them to
escape from less favorable awards in the states.7  The bill passed;
and the statute8 then, of course, became subject to judicial interpre-
tation by the High Court and to practical administration by the
tribunal which it had established.
The question of the authority of the Arbitration Court in
respect to state employees came before the High Court at an early
date in the Railway Servants' case." It seems justifiable to discuss
this case later at some length, because it gave rise to some of the
most interesting issues in Australian constitutional interpretation
and because it showed the extent to which the High Court became
the arbiter of far-reaching conflicts over social policy.
The three justices of the High Court at this time were Sir
Samuel Griffith, Sir Edmund Barton and Mr. Justice O'Connor.
All of these men had participated in the framing of the federal
constitution and were deeply devoted to the federal, as against the
unitary, principle. 10 All three had been close students of the work-
ingof the Canadian and American systems. Griffith's preference
for the American federal institutions had been made emphatic on
many occasions during the '90's.11 Barton and O'Connor had been
emphatic, in the Conventions, as to their preference for the federal
form as exhibited in the United States rather than the diluted
Canadian form. 2 It is not surprizing, therefore, that these ardent
protagonists of the federal principle, who had been among the in-
7 ibid., at 73.
8N o. 13 of 1904.
9 Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service As-
sociation v. New South Wales Railway Traffic Employees' Association, 4 C.
L. R. 488 (1906).
10 See WISE, THE mA.KING or E iAUSTRALIAN FEDERATION (1913) and
HUNT, AMERICAN PRECEDENTS IN AUsTRALiAN FEDERATION (1930), for many
references to the contributions of these men in the federation conferences.
11 See OrF.ciAL RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND )ESATES OF THE NATIONAL
AUSTRALASIu CoNENTmoN, (Sydney, 1891) pp. 16, 54, 254; HUNT, op. oit.
supra n. 10.
12 WISE, op. Cit. &Npra n. 10, at 115.
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tellectual leaders of the federation movement, continued, upon
assuming their judicial tasks, to emphasize the federal principle
and to avoid, as far as possible, every unifying tendency in in-
terpretation.
Needless to say, this emphasis upon the federal principle and
the disparagement of the more unified Canadian forms by the lead-
ers of federation were not the mere accidental results of personal
whims. Such attitudes found acceptance undoubtedly because they
expressed the prevalent demand for the protection of "state
rights." By comparison with the Canadian of1867, the Australians
of the '90's were relatively indifferent to the idea of unification.
Even the defence motive was less impelling than it had been in
Canada during the American civil war. The Canadians had
thought to profit by the example of what appeared to be an inef-
fectual union of states to the south. 13  The Australians in the '90's
were primarily intent upon gaining the practical economic ben-
efits of a central government, without sacrificing many of their
long-cherished local institutions. In 1900, no strong continent-
wide movements existed to create a sense of Australian national-
ity. The legal principles formulated by the first three judges,
therefore, may be said to represent the consensus of the opinion of
the time.
The rationalization in legal and political thought of a growing
sense of nationhood had to wait on the actual establishment and
operation, for a time, of a central government. In the early years
of federation, the nationalizing forces organized rapidly. The re-
forming labor movement quickly adapted itself to the new system
and concentrated its vigorous efforts upon the federal parliament.
Finding itself thwarted by the conservative upper chambers in the
states, it led the centralizing process by making its demands through
the new government. The Commonwealth Parliament offered, not
only less mechanical obstacles, but a wider scope for achievement in
social reform. It was this reforming Labor Party which drew up
and presented to the people the early proposals to expand the federal
powers. The political pressure of this nationalizing movement was
profoundly influential in shaping the policy of the Deakin Liberals,
who held office in 1903-04 and alternated in power with the Labor
13 See the speech of Sir John Macdonald, Feb. 6, 1865, in K:NNEDY, STAT-
UTES, TREATIES AND DocUmENTS Op THE CANADiAN CoNST'UTIo, 1713-1929
(1930) 550 et. seg.; KENNEDY, THE CONSTiTUTION OF CANADA (1922) 291
60 seq.
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Party, led by Fisher, from 1905 to 1913. It was in one of these
Deakin ministries that Isaacs served as Attorney-General; and it
was the same government which placed Isaacs and Higgins on the
High Court in 1906. It was to be expected, therefore, that these
two men would give juristic expression to the more nationalistic
view of the union of states. Their participation, as counsel, in the
Railway Servants' case occurred within a few months before their
appointment to the Bench.
The New South Wales Railway Traffic Employees' Association,
composed of employees on the state railways of New South Wales,
had applied to the Registrar of the Arbitration Court to be regis-
tered as an organization under the Arbitration Act.1 4  The appli-
cation was opposed by a rival organization but was granted by the
Registrar. The objecting association then appealed to the Presi-
dent of the Arbitration Court,' contending that, since the appli-
cant association was an organization of state railway servants, it
could not be registered, and that the Act, so far as it purported to
include state railway servants was ultra vires and void. The Presi-
dent, treating this as a question of law, stated a case for the
opinion of the High Court. Since the Commonwealth and state
governments had an interest in the outcome of the case, the High
Court permitted the states of New South Wales and Victoria and
the Commonwealth to intervene.
On behalf of the states, it ivas argued that the applicant as-
sociation of railway servants could not be registered by the Arbi-
tration Court. Since it was an organization of state employees, it
could not possibly become engaged in a "dispute extending beyond
the limits of any one State." A state did not carry on business
outside its territorial limits. Furthermore, it was argued, the Arbi-
tration Court's power to deal with disputes did not extend to busi-
nesses which were instrumentalities of a state. Such a power was
not given to the Commonwealth and should not be implied. 0
At that time, it appeared to be settled in previous High Court
4 Part V of the Act, supra n. 8, governs the procedure of registration.
15 1 Comm. Arb. Rep. 112 (1905).
16 The arguments are rather fully reported, supra n. 9, at 496 et seq. The
leading counsel for the State of Victoria was'Mr. (later Sir) E. M. Mitchell,
who was to act for employers in many future cases in which the jurisdiction
of the Federal Arbitration Court was challenged. On the other side of the
argument were Mr. H. B. Higgins, who was later to become President'of the
Arbitration Court and a Justice of the High Court; Mr. W. A. Holman, later
to be Labor Premier of New South Wales, as counsel for the applicant union,
and Mr. I. A. Isaacs (later in the High Court), as Attorney-General for the
Commonwealth.
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decisions that the agencies of the federal government were not sub-
ject to intervention or control under state law. The state govern-
ments had been balked in their efforts to assess income taxes on
federal officers.1 7 However, when the Railway Servants' case arose,
this rule of "immunity of instrumentalities" had not yet been ap-
plied, reciprocally, to forbid a federal agency to exercise control,
by taxation or otherwise, over a state authority.
In answer to the claim that the state governments should be
exempted from the operation of the Arbitration Act, it was argued
that the doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities, as applied in
the United States, where it originated,"' related only to cases where
the exercise of governmental functions, as opposed to business
undertakings, was impeded. Governmental functions were those
which could not be intended to be delegated to private persons.
Purthermore, the Arbitration Court was not intended to impose
burdens, but to confer benefits. Part of its work was mediation,
which could not possibly ixnpose a burden upon a state.
Mr. Isaacs, for the Commonwealth, argued 9 that the power of
the Commonwealth Parliament over inter-state trade and commerce
was sufficient to authorize the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court
to make awards affecting state railways. This power, he pointed
out, was conferred, not only in general terms by section 51 of the
Constitution, but quite specifically with respect to state railways
in section 98, which provides that
"The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to
trade and commerce extends to navigation and shipping, and
to railways the property of any state."
This section, said Mr. Isaacs, obviously assumes that the state rail-
way business may extend beyond one state. Counsel on this side of
27D'Emden v. Pedder, 1 C. L. R. 92 (1904). Deakin v. Webb, 1 C. L. R.
585 (1904). It should be explained that, after these two High Court deci-
sions, a similar case was appealed directly from the Supreme Court of Vic-
toria to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which decided against
the principle of immunity of instrumentalities. Webb v. Outtrim, (1907)
A. C. 81. For a time, therefore, the Judicial Committee and the High Court
held to opposite doctrines. The matter appeared to be settled when, after
the High Court had followed its own doctrine in the Baxter case 4 C. L. R.
1178 (1907), the Judicial Committee refused leave to appeal, (1908) A. C.
214. See MooRE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COmMONVEALTH O Fo AUSTRALIA
(2d ed. 1910) 421 et seg.; Haines, Judicial Interpretation of the Constitution
Act of the Commonwealth of Australia (1917) 30 HARv. L. REV. 595; Ken-
nedy, Some Aspects of Canadian and Australian Federal Constitutional Law
(1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 345.
is McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
19 Surora n. 9, at 516 et seg.
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the case did not confine themselves to purely legal arguments. Mr.
Isaacs said that
"no one can say that it is a dangerous thing to leave the settle-
ment of disputes in the inter-state carrying industry to the
control of the only body which has any means of dealing with
them effectively at one stroke." 20
Messrs. Higgins and Hohnan urged that the Constitution should
be construed in such a way as to effect its purpose, namely, the
securing of "peace, order and good government." Legislation could
be effective for this purpose only if it applied to state servants. A
dispute might be taken up with a common object in different states
and the state laws might be powerless to settle it. It should not be
assumed that the Arbitration Court would do what was injurious
to the states. Only by giving it the power could the mischief aimed
at be prevented.2 1
The decision of the High Court was that the provisions of the
Arbitration Act giving the Court power over state railways were
ultra vires of the Commonwealth Parliament and that, therefore,
the applicant association could not be registered. Chief Justice
Griffith, delivering the opinion of the whole Court, argued (asmany were to do later) that if the Arbitration Court had coercive
jurisdiction over state railway authorities, "the effective control of
the state railways may be to a great extent taken out of their
hands," and that the applicant association, if registered, would be
able to bring the New South Wales Railway Commissioners into
court as litigants for the settlement of any industrial dispute arising
between them and extending beyond the limits of New South Wales,
"whatever that expression may mean." The revenue of the rail-
ways was state revenue, even though the management was entrusted
to a body of commissioners.22
The American case, Collector v. Day,23 was quoted as author-
ity for the immunity of state instrumentalities.2' The doctrine was
said to be just as applicable to this ase as it was to the case of the
attempted invasion of the Commonwealth authority by a state
government; and that had been settled in D'Emden v. Pedder. 2
To the contention that the doctrine in these cases applied only to
20 Ibid., at 522.
21 Ibid., at 502.
22 Ibid., at 532 et seq.
22 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (1871).24 S pra n. 9, at 537.
25 Supra n. 17.
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taxation, Chief Justice Griffith answered that taxation was only
one instance of interference and control.
2 6
The case of South. Carolina v. United States,27 in which South
Carolina's monopoly of the liquor trade was held, by a six-to-three
decision, liable to federal taxation, had been cited to the Court as
a case precisely in point. Chief Justice Griffith did not attempt to
distinguish the case; and it must be noted that he gave no reason
for rejecting it, other than by observing that the minority "were
most eminent lawyers. " 2
While he did not recognize the validity of the distinction be-
tween governmental and trading functions, the Chief Justice did
attempt to show that, when the Constitution was adopted, the con-
struction and maintenance of railways was in fact generally re-
garded as a governmental function in all the Australian colonies,
since every one of the six colonial governments had established
railways.2 This was scarcely a convincing answer to the argument
of Messrs. Higgins and Holman that a "governmental" function
was one which could not be delegated to private persons.
The Chief Justice then proceeded to answer the argument that
the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court was authorized by the
interstate commerce power.30 Ignoring the rather broad grant of
power over state railways in section 98, which has no counterpart
in the Constitution of the United States, he quoted at length from
Hopkins 'v. United States,31 and drew from it the principle that, to
warrant federal control, the effect of the factors controlled upon
interstate commerce must be "direct and proximate." 2 The general
conditions of employment on state railways, he said, were not of
this character. Yet, in the early part of his opinion, he had not
so minimized the importance of employment conditions when he
argued that control of such conditions by the Arbitration Court
would put the railways to a large extent out of state control.
Chief Justice Griffith thus attempted to answer most of the
legal arguments of Messrs. Higgins, Holman and Isaacs. He ignored
completely their cogent arguments of social expediency which one
might have expected to have some weight, at least where the case
2o Supra n. 9, at 538.
27 199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110 (1905). Accord: State of Ohio v. Helvering,
292 U. S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725 (1934), discussed in (1934) 41 W. VA. L. Q. 76.
28 Justices White, Peckham and McKenna.
29Supra n. 9, at 534-535.
30 Ibid. at 541 et seq.
31171 U. S. 578, 19 S. Ct. 40 (1898).
32Tbid, at 594.
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was closely reasoned. As pointed out, however, arguments of ex-
pediency were not lacking in his own opinion.
No case could demonstrate more clearly that the federal sys-
tem, on account of the opportunity it affords for legal controversy,
makes it difficult to devise an efficient system of industrial control.
Here was an economic-legal situation, in which, apparently, no
clearly-recognized rule could be found. Only the framework of a
constitution was at hand. The case called for statesmanlike ad-
judication; yet Griffith's arguments were legal arguments in the
narrowest sense, emanating from an underlying devotion to an ab-
stract federal concept. Griffith was fond of repeating that no
powers should be allowed to the Commonwealth Parliament unless
"by express enactment or necessary implication." Yet in this case
he carefully read into the constitution a principle which could be
there only "by implication" (as later jurists thought, unnecessary
implication), namely, the immunity of state instrumentalities.A
When further cases of this kind came before the High Court,
the application of the doctrine of immunity gave the judges a great
deal of trouble. In the Steel Rasls case3 in 1908, they were re-
quired to decide whether this doctrine entitled a state to import
rails for use on its railways without paying the Commonwealth
custom duty. They decided unanimously that it did not. The
power to collect such duties, they said, was conferred upon the
Parliament in express terms in the power to make laws with re-
spect to trade and commerce with other countries and with respect
to taxation. To the contention that the collection of the duties was
a violation of section 114 of the Constitution, which forbade the
Commonwealth to lay taxes on the property of a state, a majority
of the Court answered that the customs duty was imposed, not on
the goods themselves, but on the act of importation. One may won-
der, of course, why the "express terms" of section 98 with respect
33 It was in this case that the court expressed its underlying principle of
interpretation: that the constitution must be conceived, not as an ordinary
statute, but as a contract between the parties to the federal agreement. The
Constitution Act, said the Chief Justice, is "not only an act of the Imperial
Legislature but it embodies a compact between the six Australian colonies
which formed the Commonwealth." "The rules, therefore, that in construing
the statute regard must be had to the existing laws which are modified by it,
and that in construing a contract, regard must be had to the facts and cir-
cumstances existing at the date of the contract are applicable in a special
degree to the construction of such a constitution." N. 9, at 534. For a good
discussion of this rule of interpretation, see Kennedy, op. cit. supra n. 17.34Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Collector of Customs for New
South Wales, 5 C. L. R. 818 (1908). See also King v. Sutton, 5 C. L. R. 789(1908).
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to state railways had been regarded differently, especially in the
absence of any limiting clause, such as section 114; but the Court
did not deal with this apparent inconsistency.
In 1911, the Court was asked by the President of the Arbi-
tration, Court to decide a hypothetical question as to whether the
Board of Water Supply of Sydney and the Mayor and Corporation
of Melbourne, so far as they were supplying electric light to con-
sumers, were subject to the awards of the Arbitration Court.35 The
various members of the Court (each emphasizing that his opinion
must not be considered as a judicial decision) agreed, with the
exception of Mr. Justice Higgins who declined to express an
opinion, that the Board of Water Supply of Sydney was an instru-
mentality of the state and, therefore, by the Railway Servants' de-
cision, was immune from federal interference. But they also agreed
that the Melbourne Corporation was not immune, because its electric
supply enterprize was a "trading activity." The ground for this
distinction is certainly not clear, and the hesitancy of the judges in
expressing any convictions on the matter is very evident in their
opinions. The case is important because it shows that the judges
had begun to recognize a value in the distinction between govern-
mental and trading enterprizes. They displayed a willingness, not
apparent in the RaiZway Servants' case, to accept the correctness
of the decision in Southi Carolina v. United States.3" Mr. Justice
O'Connor said that
"the implication [of non-interference] is not to be carried be-
yond the limits of necessity. Having regard to the very great
difference between the public services undertaken by munici-
palities in the United States and those undertaken by munici-
palities in Australia, this Court might well hesitate to adopt
the principles laid down in those [earlier American] cases in
their entirety. . . .,37
Mr. Justice Higgins, with somewhat more boldness, declared:
"The whole doctrine of exemption of instrumentalities rests on
inference; and the inference becomes more and more difficult
as the activities of the state increase. How can anyone say
that business undertakings of the State were meant to be
exempted by a Constitution framed in 1789, at a time when no
one dreamed of such undertakings?' '3
35Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemens' Association of Australasia v.
Broken Hill Proprietary Co., Ltd., 12 C. L. R. 398 (1911).
3 upra n. 27.
37 Supa n. 35, at 443.
38 Ibid. at 460.
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The question as to the Melbourne Corporation was raised again in
1913,39 although, as in the former case, it did not call for a final
judicial decision. The Court merely confirmed its dictum in the
case of 1911.
The difficulties finally came to a head when the Engineers'
case came before the High Court in 1920.40 The state of Western
Australia owned and controlled certain trading concerns, in the
form of engineering works, sawmills and steamships, and claimed
immunity for them from the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth
Arbitration Court. Obviously it was difficult to differentiate be-
tween state trading activities and state railways. The High Court
apparently began to realize that to grant immunity to state trading
concerns would be to enable the states to encroach extensively upon
Commonwealth powers by simply making each trading activity a
state government instrumentality This dilemma involved in apply-
ing the doctrine of immunity had been clearly seen by the majority
in South Caroina, v. United, States.4  If the power to tax was the
power to destroy, it was equally true that the power to create tax-
exempt (or award-exempt?) trading enterprizes was a power to
destroy.42
Confronted with these alternatives and with its own confusing
precedents, the High Court treated the Engineers' case (which it
did not need to do) 4 as though the issue before it was whether to
grant the immunity or to resort to the rather drastic expedient of
renouncing completely the doctrine of non-interference. It chose
the latter course.
The personnel of the Bench had changed considerably since
the doctrine of implied prohibitions and the doctrine of immunity
were first elaborated. Chief Justice Griffith and Justices Barton
89 Federated Engine Drivers', etc., v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., Ltd., 16
C. L. R. 245 (1913).
40 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co., 28 C. L.
R. 129 (1920).
41 Supra n. 27.
42 Mr. Justice Brewer said: "Obviously if the power of the State is carried
to the extent suggested, and with it is relief from all Federal taxation, the
national government would be largely crippled in its revenues .... In other
words, in this indirect way, it would be within the competency of the States
to practically destroy the efficiency of the national government." Ibid., at
455.
43 The Court could have decided the case in the same way without over-
ruling the Railway Servants' case, because it had never held, except in the
hypothetical cases already mentioned, that state trading concerns other than
railways were immune from federal interference. By settling the larger issue
in this case, it saved itself the embarrassment of confirming a none too
plausible distinction and avoided further inconvenience and confusion.
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and O'Connor, who had constituted a majority on the Bench in the
early days, were now all removed by death and retirement. Afr.
Justice Isaacs (who delivered and, no doubt, wrote, the opinion in
the Engineers' case) and Mr. Justice Higgins remained; and four
others appointed between 1912 and 1920 completed the Court.
Naturally, they were dissatisfied with the application of the doc-
trine of the immunity of state instrumentalities. They therefore
swept away entirely the conception of implied prohibitions. In
declaring that the government of a state, as an employer, might be
a party to an industrial dispute and, therefore, bound by an award
of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, the High Court said:
". ... it is beyond any doubt that the doctrine of 'implied
prohibition' can no longer be permitted to sustain a contention,
and so far as any recorded decision rests upon it, that decision
must be regarded as unsound."4 4
Speaking of its past decisions on this doctrine, the Court made the
rather startling admission that
"The more these decisions are examined and compared with
each other and with the Constitution itself, the more evident
it becomes that no clear principle can account for them .... "
S..... some are .... rested on implication drawn from what
is called the principle of 'necessity,' that being itself referable
to no more definite standard than the personal opinion of the
Judge who declares it. The attempt to deduce any consistent
rule from them has not only failed, but has disclosed an in-
creasing entanglement and uncertainty, and a conflict with
the text of the Constitution and with distinct and clear decla-
rations of law by the Privy Council." 4
The Court announced that, henceforth, the Constitution, being
a legislative act, would be interpreted by applying the well-known
rules for interpreting statutes. It would be permitted
"to speak with its own voice, clear of any qualifications which
the people of the Commonwealth, or at their request, the Im-
perial Parliament, have not thought fit to express, and clear
of any questions of expediency or political exigency which
this Court is neither intended to consider nor equipped with
the means of determining.""
The High Court took this occasion to discuss the future use in Aus-
tralia of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Those
44 Supra n. 40, at 160.
4 Ibid. at 141-2.
46h Ibid. at 160.
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decisions might be recognized as useful for guidance in cases of
ambiguity, but in no sense finally authoritative. 4  In other words,
the Court reverted to the principles enunciated by the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council in Canadian cases and in certain early
Australian cases. These principles were based on several funda-
mental differences between the United States Constitution and the
Constitutions of Canada and Australia. One form of constitution
was organic, the other statutory. Moreover, the Australian and
Canadian systems were distinguished from the American by the
indivisibility of the Crown. The Crown, in right of New South
Wales, for example, might be bound by what the Crown, in right
of the Commonwealth, had enacted.48  Another difference lay in the
existence of the royal veto,49 which served as a safeguard, non-
existent in the American system except in the Supreme Court it-
self, against any extreme usurpation of power by state or central
government."
The High Court proclaimed boldly in this case that it was not
concerned with the possible abuse by the Commonwealth of the
extensive powers which the Constitution entrusted to it. The
narrower legal view of the federal system, so common among both
lawyers and laymen, and so often useful to vested interests, was
disposed of in a gently satirical manner.
"If it be conceivable that the representatives of the people of
Australia as a whole would ever proceed to use their powers to
injure the people of Australia considered sectionally, it is cer-
tainly within the power of the people themselves to resent
and reverse what may be done. "51
In summary, one is tempted to say that the High Court
"muddled through" to a workable formula of interpretation. The
old formula, imported from the United States, against the well-
established precedents of the Privy Council, to support the "state-
rights" viewpoint of the elder judges, was found to be utterly
47 Ibid. at 146.
48 Ibid. at 146-7, 152 et seq.
ignored by the Court. Supra n. 9, at 501.
49 This point had been urged by counsel in the Railway Servants' case, but
ignored by the Court. Supra n. 9, at 501.
so The Judicial Committee had rejected the principle of McCulloch v. Mary-
land as not in accordance with the British conception of parliamentary
sovereignty. Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 12 A. C. 575 (1887). See Haines,
op. cit. and Kennedy, op. cit., supra, n. 17; and Abbott v. City of St. John,
40 S. C. R. 597 (1908); Caron v. The King, A. C. 999 (1924). For early
Australian cases, see supra n. 17.
5 Supra n. 40, at 151-152.
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untenable. The two junior judges, Isaacs and Higgins, as well as
(with more hesitancy) O'Connor, had demonstrated this by em-
phasizing the different conditions of Australian life, where govern-
ments were so extensively engaged in industrial concerns. The
United States Supreme Court itself had limited the doctrine in
1905, just before the Australian court, in the Railway Servants'
case, was entering upon its long period of vacillation and confusion.
Faced with the urgent necessity for abandoning the formula,
technical legal arguments were found in the indivisibility of the
Crown and in the character of the Constitution as a statute.
State government enterprises, such as railways and a variety
of other public activities, if involved in interstate disputes, are all
liable now to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court, just as
private enterprises are liable. This far-reaching authority of the
fedbral tribunal has given rise to one of the major problems of
federalism in Australia. By doing away with the inconveniences
and confusion caused by the old doctrine, the High Court, in the
Engineers' case, gave an added stimulus to the controversy over
the question of state subordination to the Commonwealth.
Varying degrees of dissatisfaction are expressed by the state
governments and their agencies. The state of Western Australia,
in her recently-published "Case for Secession," bitterly denounces
the recent tendencies in constitutional interpretation. The effect
of the Engineers' decision, she claims, has been to make the
Commonwealth Parliament
" .... a supreme authority, whose word .... can effectively
rule the Government of the State itself, and lay commands
upon it which may actually threaten the existence of the state
as an organization." 2
As these words suggest, the complaining attitude of the state
governments is based in part on the sense of proprietorship which
state officers so often assume in defending "the existence of the
state as an organization." Nevertheless, 'there is a more sub-
stantial ground for complaint. It is shown clearly by the Royal
Commission which reported in 1929 on "The Finances of South
Australia as Affected by Federation." The Commission found that
wage increases on the South Australia railways in recent years had
been due mainly to awards of the federal Arbitration Court. It
drew attention to the fact that, whereas the state parliament was
G2 "The Case of the People of Western Australia . . . . " (Government
Printer, Perth, 1934) § 135.
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able to approve or disapprove increases in wages proposed in state
awards, it had no check or veto on federal awards. The federal
award had to be obeyed no matter what the consequehces might be
to the financial position of the state. 3  States bound by federal
awards with respect to their railway employees claim that they
have been obliged to lay off employees, to avoid a higher expendi-
ture than they could afford' 4
It may matter little whether "the existence of the state as an
organization" is preserved. The problem as to whether the states
should be sovereign entities or whether they should be parts of an
administrative hierarchy is merely one of adapting means to ends.
Yet their present position is anomalous. They are expected to be
responsible, in the main, for their own financial stability ;,but the
Commonwealth, by wage-fixing and other means, -may drastically
affect their finances. The states complain that, while the Common-
wealth determines many of the amounts which must be spent, as
on wages, the states are left to find most of their own funds.
The problem is, of course, also bound up with general ques-
tions of industrial policy, especially with the question, too complex
to be discussed here, as to whether the federal tribunal should have
full power to declare basic wage rates and to determine working
hours on a Commonwealth basis.
Even as early as 1911 and 1913, on account of the obstacles
resulting from the Railway Servants' decision, the labor movement
was able to secure the submission of referenda for a constitutional
amendment to enable the Parliament to authorize the Arbitration
Court to fix wages and hours for state railway employees. Both
of these proposals were rejected, the second by a very slight ma-
jority." In 1923, a Ministers' Conference passed resolutions favor-
ing an enactment by the Parliament to provide that state employees
should be denied access to the Commonwealth Court, and proposing
that the constitution should be amended with the same object.5
This resolution was never acted upon.
53 COMM. PARL. PAPERS, 1929, No. 44, p. 27.
54 See complaint of the Premier of New South Wales in Conference of
Commonwealth and State Ministers, Feb. 1930. CoMM. PARL. PAPERS, 1929.
30, No. 111, p. 22; and speech of Premier of Tasmania, Conference on Con-
stitutional Matters, Melbourne, Feb. 1934, CoMM. PARL. PAPERS, 1932-34, No.
F. 519, p. 37.
55 REPORT OP THE ROYAL COMIsSSION ON TrE CONSTITUTION (1929) 932
et seq.
"G Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers, 1923, Com.31. PARL.
PAERs (1923-24) Vol. ]a, No. 38, at p. ix.
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Evidence was presented before the Royal Commission on the
Constitution to show that, on account of federal arbitration awards,
it was impossible for state treasurers to estimate their expenditures
and that a central court could not handle wage disputes as well as
courts familiar with local conditions. On the other hand, there
were powerful unions of railway and other state employees who
urged the inclusion of all state employees under the jurisdiction of
the federal court5 7
In addition to the difficulties of finance and general wage
policy, there is inconvenience and confusion resulting from the
overlapping of state and federal awards. The Premier of New
South Wales stated recently in a Ministers' Conference that about
one-half of the railway servants in his state were on federal awards,
while the others were under awards of the state tribunal. He con-
fessed, however, that his government could see no way out except
to transfer all authority in the matter to the Commonwealth. 8
When a recent conference of state Ministers of Transport drew
up a resolution favoring the exclusion of state railway servants
from the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, the
Commonwealth government declined to submit such a policy to
Parliament. 9
The Royal Commission, in its Report in 1929, was divided in
opinion. While three members recommended that all state em-
ployees should be specifically excluded from Commonwealth juris-
diction, two members went to the other extreme and recommended
that all state employees should be brought under the federal court.6 0
The issue is, therefore, far from settled. 'It will not be sur-
prising, however, if most of the states ultimately yield to Common-
wealth supremacy, in this as in so many other functions. Assuming
that the system of arbitration will remain, one ventures to predict
that state employment will ultimately, along with all private em-
ployment, be subject to standards fixed by a Commonwealth tri-
bunal.
67 Supra in. 55, at 165.
as Conference on Constitutional Matters, supra n. 54, at p. 17.
59 Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers, Melbourne, June, 1933,
Comm. P nn. PAPERs (1933) No. F. 2184, p. 9.
0o Supra n. 55, at 276, 303.
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